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From Library to Liability—Importing Trade Secret 
Doctrines to Erase Unfair Copyright Risks Lurking in 
YouTube’s Creative Commons Library 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Profiting off someone else’s work keeps getting easier. The digital 
age has brought with it new tools for finding and leveraging the 
creative handiwork of others. Not the least of these new tools is 
YouTube’s new Creative Commons library.1 The video-sharing 
behemoth’s Creative Commons library is a repository of millions2 of 
videos uploaded by YouTube users who have granted anyone, 
anywhere license to re-use and modify their works. Video creators can 
search the library and incorporate the videos into their own videos—
even when those videos have a commercial purpose—without paying 
any royalties or licensing fees.3 
Some creatives have lauded YouTube’s efforts to further “open 
the door to collective imagination.”4 
Do you need a professional opening for your San Francisco vacation 
video? Perhaps some gorgeous footage of the moon for your science 
project? How about a squirrel eating a walnut to accompany your 
hot new dubstep track? All of this and more is available to inspire 
and add to your unique creation.5 
But like any other new tool, YouTube’s Creative Commons library 
comes with potential for abuse and legal controversy. For example, 
video creators can simply republish Creative Commons videos in 
 
 1. Elliot Harmon, Four Million CC-Licensed Videos Uploaded to YouTube, 
CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG (July 25, 2012), 
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/33421 (“By letting people remix and adapt 
videos without having sophisticated editing software or expertise, YouTube and CC are making 
it easier for anyone to build on the work of others. And that’s pretty cool.”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Creative Commons, YOUTUBE HELP, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797468 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 4. Cathy Casserly, Here’s your invite to reuse and remix the 4 million Creative Commons-
licensed videos on YouTube, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (July 25, 2012), http://youtube-
global.blogspot.com/2012/07/heres-your-invite-to-reuse-and-remix-4.html. 
 5. Id. 
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entirety without any creative additives except a new (and perhaps more 
search engine-optimized) name and compete with the original owner 
for profitable views.6 The only benefit the open-minded video donors 
(those who initially add the video to YouTube’s Creative Commons) 
get from the bargain is a buried link to their donated videos in the 
borrower’s video description.7 While this is no doubt an issue of great 
frustration for those donors who feel borrowers have taken advantage 
of their creative generosity, this Comment leaves that issue for another 
day. This Comment instead addresses a far more problematic and far-
reaching issue: the complex copyright risks that well-intentioned and 
mostly uninformed borrowers face when leveraging YouTube’s 
Creative Commons library. 
In particular, Creative Commons borrowers may face copyright 
liability for republishing content that Creative Commons donors 
never had the right to donate in the first place. This is likely the case 
without consideration of whether the borrowers acted in bad faith. 
This should not be the case. Republishing or modifying a work that is 
presented as fair game Creative Commons material through the 
facilitation of an Internet powerhouse, like YouTube, should not 
expose good faith borrowers to liability. 
Part II of this Comment demonstrates that under the current 
copyright regime, an untold number of YouTube video creators who 
use Creative Commons videos in their own works could be strictly 
liable for substantial statutory damages—even for good-faith 
borrowing. Part III recommends that copyright law adapt to protect 
the interests of such well-meaning creatives by adopting a well-
accepted doctrine from another realm of intellectual property—
namely, the doctrine protecting good faith “second publishers” under 
trade secret law. Part VI concludes. 
 
 6. Ekai, Why I’m Giving up on Creative Commons on YouTube, EDDIE.COM (Sept. 5, 
2014), http://eddie.com/2014/09/05/why-im-giving-up-on-creative-commons-on-
youtube/ (“The real issue is YouTube’s remix tool is horribly broken. Of the 68 videos that 
users have ’remixed’ from my video, 36 are wholesale reposts of my entire video (many of which 
are monetized with ads). 28 are by accounts that have since been deleted by YouTube for various 
TOS violations and a whopping THREE are actual original new works in which a sample of my 
video appears.”). 
 7. Id. 
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II. COPYRIGHT LIABILITY UNDER THE CURRENT LAW 
Well-intentioned Creative Commons borrowers have expressed 
frustration when, after investing time and energy to publish and 
promote new videos leveraging resources in YouTube’s Creative 
Commons library, their YouTube accounts have received copyright 
strikes. These strikes make it so that creatives can no longer monetize 
any videos on their channels—not just those accused of violating 
copyright laws.8 
[H]ow could it be, that I get . . . copyright strikes on some of these 
videos when they are supposed to be in the CC-BY9 license? As 
You[T]ube is also attributing the original Video [sic] with the links 
to it and I also put the original author and links into my video 
descriptions, there should be no copyright strike on these types 
of videos[.]10 
In other words, YouTube penalizes creatives who unwittingly use 
copyrighted material illegally placed in the Creative Commons by 
others.  Hoping to avoid headaches like this in the future, video 
creators are left to wonder: how can they borrow from the Creative 
Commons library without putting their YouTube accounts at risk?11 
That is ultimately a question left for YouTube and its policy team to 
answer, though common sense would suggest that YouTube strike 
offending donors, not borrowers.12 But more alarming than the risks 
of YouTube’s internal remedial efforts, is that well-meaning Creative 
 
 8. Forum, YouTube Monetization: Phone number from Youtube Copyright team ? Need to 
speak with someone from the DMCA Counter Notification team, GOOGLE PRODUCT FORUMS 
(Jan. 15, 2014), https://productforums.google.com/forum/#!category-topic/monetization-
on-youtube/monetization-is-disabled-on-my-channel/q7Q8MKtmn_g. 
 9. CC-BY is the broadest of Creative Commons licenses. It “lets others distribute, remix, 
tweak, and build upon your work, even commercially, as long as they credit you for the original 
creation.” About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2016). 
 10. Forum, YouTube Monetization: Getting Copyright Strikes on Creative Commons CC-
BY Youtube CC Library videos after remixing them, GOOGLE PRODUCT FORUMS (Jan. 15, 
2014), https://productforums.google.com/forum/#!topic/monetization-on-
youtube/Wu4L_OJ4VdE. 
 11. Id. 
 12. It is true that YouTube may be legally obligated to take down any videos borrowing 
copyrighted content that should have never been donated into the Creative Commons library, 
but that does not mean that YouTube should penalize good-faith borrowers by demonetizing 
or disabling accounts. 
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Commons borrowers can be sued for statutory damages because of 
donor copyright disregard. 
A. Strict Civil Liability for Infringing Creative Commons Borrowers 
Creative Commons borrowers currently face strict liability for 
copyright infringement that results from a donor’s disregard for 
others’ copyrights.13 “Noticeably absent from [the copyright civil14 
liability] standard is any scienter, intent, knowledge, negligence, or 
similar culpable mental state.”15 Copyright holders can sue well-
intentioned Creative Commons borrowers for an injunction16 
(requiring the borrower to cease infringement) and damages 
(monetary relief).17 
Just because Creative Commons borrowers have received a license 
to use YouTube library content likely does nothing to hamper strict 
liability statutory damages when donors have no right to grant a 
license to borrowers. Copyright is property, “which [can]not be 
legally deprived without . . . consent” from the actual copyright 
holder.18 In American Press Ass’n v. Daily Story Publishing Co., one 
publisher led a second publisher to believe an article was not subject 
to copyright.19 In reliance on the representations of the first publisher, 
the second publisher reproduced the article without getting 
 
 13. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Comm. Serv’s, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (“[Copyright]  infringement  does  not  require  intent or any particular state 
of mind . . . .”). 
 14. Creative Commons borrowers do not face criminal liability. Criminal copyright 
liability requires “willful” infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012). Good faith infringement is the 
antithesis of willful infringement; thus, such borrowers likely face no criminal exposure. 
 15. Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 356 (2002); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–505 (2012); David N. Weiskopf, 
The Risks of Copyright Infringement on the Internet: A Practitioner’s Guide, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 
14 (1998) (“Indeed, a party can even be liable for direct copyright infringement for unconscious 
copying of another’s protected work, as well as for innocent copying.”) (internal quotations, 
citations, and emphasis omitted). 
 16. This Comment will not dwell on injunctive relief because it does not suggest that 
good faith Creative Commons borrowers should be shielded from injunctions; no amount of 
good faith should permit an infringer to continue infringing, let alone profit off continued 
infringement. Instead, this Comment will focus on actual and statutory damages. 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
 18. American Press Ass’n v. Daily Story Pub. Co., 120 F. 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1902). 
 19. Id. at 767. 
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permission from the article’s actual author.20 The Ninth Circuit found 
the second publisher liable for copyright infringement.21 “It is not 
material, we think, that the [second publisher] in publishing this 
copyrighted story was not aware that the story was protected by 
copyright. [The second publisher] published it at its peril, and 
ignorance will not avail.”22 The Ninth Circuit reasoned, “[t]itle to 
copyright is no more lost by the theft of the manuscript, or piratical 
publication of it, than is one’s title to a horse lost by the stealing of it, 
or by the unlawful sale of it to a stranger.”23 
Though American Press is over a century old and operated prior 
to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act 
of 1976, it is consistent with courts’ continued merciless enforcement 
of strict copyright liability. For example, in Sater Design Collection, 
Inc. v. Waccamaw Construction, Inc., the United States District Court 
for the District of South Carolina found a prima facie case for 
copyright infringement against a well-intentioned home construction 
company.24 The construction company had no idea that the building 
plans given to it by two future home owners were sold to the future 
home owners by a third party who did not actually own the copyright 
to the plans or have permission to distribute them.25 
The reliance that Creative Commons borrowers place on the 
representations of library donors is not unlike the reliance a 
homebuilder places on plans given to it. As in Sater Design, where the 
court ruled that an unlawful blueprint sale could not defeat an 
infringement claim against an ignorant builder, it is likely that a court 
would find that an unlawful video donation does not defeat claims 
alleging infringement by Creative Commons borrowers. 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 770. 
 22. Id. at 769. 
 23. Id. at 768. 
 24. See Sater Design Collection, Inc. v. Waccamaw Constr., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15226, *25, 27 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2011). 
 25. Id. (“Assuming that the Qwest plan infringed Sater’s copyright, Waccamaw and 
Hostetler may have difficulty avoiding liability by asserting they did not know they were 
infringing Sater’s copyright by using the Qwest design to build the Waterton residence. Case 
law establishes that knowledge or intent is not an element of copyright infringement . . . . A 
builder constructing a house based on a copyrighted set of plans without permission from the 
copyright holder would arguably constitute conduct that causes in some meaningful way              
an   infringement.”). 
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B. “Fair Use” May Not Excuse Many Good Faith Creative Commons 
Borrowers 
Fair use likely will not excuse the unknowing copyright 
infringement committed by many good faith Creative Commons 
borrowers. Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement based on 
reasonableness.26 Fair use “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid 
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle 
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”27 Whether a 
use qualifies as fair use hinges mostly on four statutory factors, which 
sound straight-forward enough: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.28 
Judges can also consider any other factors they deem relevant, such as 
attribution, which would weigh in favor of fair use.29 But courts rarely, 
if ever, give weight to good faith, which, if considered, would also 
weigh in favor of fair use.30 
Each statutory factor merits a brief explanation. Regarding the 
purpose or character of use, commercial use weighs against fair use, 
while nonprofit or educational use weighs in favor.31 Works of artistic 
natures usually get more protection than works that are 
informational.32 The odds of fair use decreases as the quantity and 
quality of borrowed material increases in relation to the original 
 
 26. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). 
 27. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 29. Kevin J. Hickey, Consent, User Reliance, and Fair Use, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 397, 410 
(2014) (“Courts have discretion to consider a variety of other factors, and they often do so.”). 
 30. However, courts occasionally let “bad faith” tip the scales against fair use. See id. at 
410 n.53 (citing NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
   31. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (“The fact that a publication was commercial as 
opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
   32. Id. at 594 (“the scope of fair use is generally broader when the source of borrowed 
expression is a factual or historical work”). 
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work.33 And the odds of fair use decreases as the harm, whether 
individually or in the aggregate, to the original work’s 
market increases.34 
Not all factors of the fair use defense are created equal.35 The 
second statutory factor (“nature of the borrowed work”) “is 
considered to be the least important fair use factor, and has been found 
to exert almost no influence on the actual outcomes of fair use 
cases.”36 In contrast, a leading empirical study suggests that the first 
statutory factor (“purpose of use”) and, to an even greater degree, the 
fourth statutory factor (“market effect”) are the most influential in 
driving fair use outcomes.37  
This comes as little surprise because three decades ago, the United 
States Supreme Court demonstrated its preoccupation with factors 
one and four over a series of cases. In reference to the first factor, the 
Court stated, “every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that 
belongs to the owner of the copyright.”38 A year later, in reference to 
the fourth factor, the Court stated that the effect on a copyrighted 
work’s market “is undoubtedly the single most important [factor] of 
fair use.”39 
Still, not unlike many legal factor tests, figuring out whether a 
court will call copyright infringement “fair use” is no easy task. 
Scholars and judges have called fair use “unpredictable,”40 “most 
 
   33. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It is not fair use when more of 
the original is copied than necessary. Even more critical than the quantity is the qualitative degree 
of the copying: what degree of the essence of the original is copied in relation to its whole.”). 
   34. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (“It requires 
courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the 
alleged infringer, but also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in 
by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the 
original.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 35. Hickey, supra note 29,  at 409. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 409 n.49 (quoting Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair 
Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 586 (2008) (“[T]he outcome of the fourth 
factor appears to drive the outcome of the test, and that the outcome of the first factor also 
appears to be highly influential.”)). 
 38. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
 39. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 40. See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 29, at 445 (“Fair use is frequently derided for creating 
uncertainty through an unpredictable, multi-factor test.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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troublesome,”41 “muddy,”42 “messy,”43 “amorphous,”44 “erratic,”45 
“fickle,”46 “capricious,”47 “arbitrary,”48 and “unreliable,”49 along with 
other accusatory adjectives.50 
Even in the face of its unpredictability, it is likely that many 
Creative Commons borrowers who use infringing works from 
YouTube’s library would not be protected by a fair use defense. As 
mentioned, the library allows the blatant, wholesale copying of other 
videos for commercial purposes without requiring royalties.51 
Regarding the purpose of use (which, again, is one of the most 
important factors), courts would not likely find a purpose that aligns 
with fair use. Most likely, many borrowers monetize their YouTube 
 
 41. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[T]he issue of 
fair use, which alone is decided, is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright . . . .”). 
 42. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 
(1999) (“Copyright doctrines such as fair use appear to operate as muddy entitlements. . . . It is 
essentially impossible to determine in advance of litigation whether a particular unauthorized 
use is fair; the copyright statute instructs courts to consider several factors in determining fair 
use, including the extent of the taking, the type of work involved, the use made, and the effect 
on the market for the work—a classic ‘muddy’ balancing test.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free 
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 590 (2004) (“Fair use and free speech 
are messy concepts.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 
1533 (1989) (“the amorphous ‘fair use’ defense”). 
 45. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter, Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use 
and Fair Licensing, 102 CAL. L. REV. 53, 65 (2014) (“The erratic path of fair use case law has 
led some scholars to conclude that it is now virtually impossible to predict the outcome of fair 
use cases.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 46. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Symposium, Introduction: Infringement Nation: Copyright 
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543 (2007) (“Fair use is, after all, 
notoriously fickle and the defense offers little ex ante refuge to users of copyrighted works.”). 
 47. John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an 
Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1216 (2005) (“The capricious 
outcome of fair-use cases has, of course, been previously observed.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Adventures in the Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Absence 
of Independent First Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes, 14 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 273, 291 (2009) (“Fair use . . . thus seems arbitrary and unreliable.”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 16-CLRP8 (“Treatises say 
that the scope and limit of fair use is most obscure.”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability 
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1619 (2009) (“the currently 
incomprehensible fair use doctrine”). 
   51.  Creative Commons, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/ youtube/
answer/2797468 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
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videos. The fact that YouTube allows users to do this is a major selling 
point of the Creative Commons library. Courts would likely find that 
the commercial purpose behind monetization cuts against fair use.52 
As for the nature of the borrowed work, the library contains videos 
of different natures. Some have a utilitarian nature (e.g. how-to videos 
or tutorials), others a more factual nature (e.g. news reports), and still 
others a more artistic nature (e.g. comedy sketches). The more artistic 
videos would likely get more protection, which would cut against fair 
use.53 But, because courts typically give little weight to the nature of 
the allegedly infringing work,54 a video’s nature likely will not push the 
court in any meaningful way. 
Regarding the amount and substantiality of the use, it is likely that 
courts would find many borrowers take too much content from both 
quantitative and qualitative standpoints. First, there is nothing to 
prevent a borrower from using the entirety of an uploaded video. And, 
more importantly, borrowers have an incentive to use the most 
valuable or substantial part of the videos in the library. If a user is 
interested in making money through YouTube video monetization (or 
just producing the best product he can for other purposes), he is not 
likely to copy boring or insubstantial stuff content, but the juicy, 
potential-to-go-viral stuff. 
As for the final and most important statutory factor—market 
effect—a court would likely have another reason to disfavor finding 
fair use. Borrowing likely hurts the market for the original copyrighted 
works in several ways. First, to the extent original video owners hope 
to generate income through advertising, relying on view or click 
counts, any copying likely waters down the channel’s web traffic. It is 
also possible that many copiers aim for the same audience as the 
original, making any web traffic dilution more acute. Second, there is 
a market for stock videos. People are willing to pay subscription fees 
 
 52. Of course, those borrowers who opt out of monetization and produce videos for other 
purposes (like the teacher who wishes to compile a few clips for a class), will be able to make a 
much better case for fair use. 
 53. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (“This factor calls for recognition that some works are 
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair 
use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.”); Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 594 (1985) (“not all copyrights are fungible . . . copying 
a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a motion picture”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
   54.  Hickey, supra note 29, at 409. 
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to stock video libraries which license copyrighted works for royalties.55 
Thus, at the very least, unpermitted, royalty-free borrowing harms 
video authors’ licensing market. As mentioned supra, one of the major 
draws of the YouTube Creative Commons library is that users can find 
and borrow quality content without paying a dime for it. 
Though there may be judge-imposed factors such as attribution56, 
those factors likely would not make a difference in the face of 
substantial, commercial copying that harms the market value of 
original videos. Thus, fair use would not likely shield many borrowers 
of infringing content from liability. 
C. Damages Payable by Infringing Creative Commons Borrowers 
Infringing Creative Commons borrowers could be required to 
fork over at least hundreds—even thousands—of dollars to rightful 
copyright holders regardless of how much damage is actually 
suffered.57 Even if the copyright holder suffers no actual damages (i.e., 
lost profits) from the infringement, the copyright holder can still 
collect statutory damages.58 Statutory damages generally range from 
$750 to $30,000.59 
Section 504 also contains an exception to the $750 floor, which 
permits a payment as low as $200 if the borrower can prove she “had 
no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of 
copyright.”60 According to the statute’s plain terms, if a library 
borrower had any reason at all to think the library donor did not have 
the right to license the borrowed video or any other reason to think 
his or her acts constituted infringement, this exception would not 
 
 55. See, e.g., SHUTTERSTOCK, www.shutterstock.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2016); 
ISTOCK, www.istockphoto.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2016). 
 56. The attribution consideration would also cut against fair use. Though attribution 
automatically occurs when users borrow content from YouTube’s Creative Commons library, 
the attribution is going to the wrong place (i.e., to the infringing donor—not to the actual 
copyright holder). 
   57. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final 
judgment is rendered, to recover, instead  of  actual  damages  and profits, an award of 
statutory damages . . . .”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. There is an exception to the $30,000 ceiling that likely would not apply to good 
faith borrowers because their infringement is not “committed willfully.” Id. 
 60. Id. (emphasis added). 
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apply.61 For example, the exception likely would not apply if it 
appeared that the donor simply recorded and uploaded a portion of a 
television broadcast to the library. However, even if the standard is 
met, any damage diminution still hinges on judicial discretion.62 In 
addition to damages, the statute offers the possibility of injunctive 
relief and attorney fees.63 
III. EXTENDING TRADE SECRET SECOND-PUBLISHER 
PROTECTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 
Good faith Creative Commons borrowers should not bear the 
illustrated risks of statutory or other damages any more than good 
faith second publishers of trade secrets should bear those same risks 
for misappropriation. Likes should be treated alike.  And the 
competing policies delineating the bounds of trade secret protection 
mirror the policies justifying copyright protection. 
A. Trade Secret Second-Publisher Protections 
A trade secret is confidential business information that endows a 
company with competitive advantage.64 Trade secrets are governed by 
state law, but almost every state has adopted the Uniform Trade Secret 
Act.65 Under the UTSA, the owner of trade secret can sue others 
misappropriating (or misusing) that trade secret.66 Misuse includes 
wrongful disclosures (or publication).67 
Whether the wrongful publication of a trade secret incurs liability 
on a second publisher depends on the second publisher’s knowledge.68 
 
   61. Id. 
 62. See id. (“[T]he court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages . . . 
.”) (emphasis added). 
 63. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 505 (2012). 
 64. Matthew Edward Cavanaugh, Contract + Tort = Property: The Trade Secret 
Illustration, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 427, 449 (2012). 
 65. To date, forty seven states have enacted the UTSA and two of the three holdout states 
are considering its adoption this year. Legislative Fact Sheet - Trade Secrets Act, 
UNIFORMLAWS.ORG, http://www.uniformlaws.org/legislativefactsheet.aspx?title=trade%20
secrets%20act (last accessed Oct. 27, 2015). 
 66. UTSA § 1.2 (1979), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20
secrets/utsa_ final_85.pdf. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
4.BALINSKI.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2016  2:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
982 
According to the UTSA, a second publisher can be liable for trade 
secret misappropriation if 
at the time of disclosure or use, [the second publisher] knew or had 
reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived 
from or through a person who had utilized improper means to 
acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or through 
a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain 
its secrecy or limit its use.69 
If a second publisher should know that she is re-publishing a trade 
secret that the initial publisher acquired through improper means or 
disclosed in breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the second 
publisher is liable for misappropriating the trade secret.70 On the other 
hand, if the second publisher has no reason to know that the initial 
publisher acquired the trade secret through improper means or 
disclosed the trade secret in breach of a confidentiality agreement, 
then the second publisher is immune to suit.71 
For example, if a disgruntled non-disclosure-agreement-bound 
former employee of Super Duper Saucy company takes to the web and 
publishes the ingredients to his former employer’s super-secret BBQ 
sauce in a blog post entitled “An Ex-Employee’s Super Saucy Exposé: 
The Recipe the World Has Been Waiting For,” and then a popular 
recipe blog re-publishes the secret recipe on its own site, it is quite 
likely that Super Duper Saucy could successfully sue the recipe site for 
trade secret misappropriation. Strong arguments could be made that 
the context and title of the recipe put the recipe site on notice that the 
 
 69. UTSA § 1.2(ii)(B); Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness 
and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 199–200 (2005) 
(italics omitted) (“Liability for misappropriation under the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition is nearly identical to that of the UTSA.”). In regards to second publishers, the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition finds trade secret liability when “at the time of the 
use or disclosure, (1) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade secret 
that the actor acquired under circumstances creating a duty of confidence owed by the actor to 
the other . . . ; or (2) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade secret 
that the actor acquired by means that are improper . . . ; or (3) the actor knows or has reason to 
know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired from or through a person 
who acquired it by means that are improper . . . or whose disclosure of the trade secret 
constituted a breach of a duty of confidence owed to the other . . . .” § 40(b). 
 70. UTSA § 1.2(ii)(B). 
 71. See id. 
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recipe was a trade secret. However, if the former employee had instead 
published the trade secret in a post entitled, “The Amazing Sauce I 
Invented Yesterday that will Change the World Forever,” then Super 
Duper Saucy would likely not succeed in a trade secret suit against the 
recipe site for damages. Of course, Super Duper Saucy would still be 
able to pursue a remedy against the disgruntled employee for the 
initial disclosure.72 Also, if Super Duper Saucy (or anyone else) put the 
recipe site on notice regarding the recipe’s trade secret status, the 
recipe site could be liable for future misappropriation (e.g., failure to 
remove the offending re-publication).73 
B. How Trade Secret Second-Publisher Protections Could Extend to 
Copyright Infringement 
If trade secret second-publisher protections extended to copyright 
claims against Creative Commons borrowers, it would mean that 
unless a borrower had reason to know that the Creative Commons 
donor did not have authority to license the borrowed video (e.g., 
because the donor did not own the copyright to the video he uploaded 
to the library), the Creative Commons borrower could not be sued 
for damages. This would not leave the copyright owners without 
remedy. As in the context of trade secrets, where the improper initial 
publisher can still be sued for misappropriation, the copyright owner 
could still sue the infringing Creative Commons library for 
infringement. In addition, there would be nothing to prevent the 
copyright owner from putting the Creative Commons borrower on 
notice that the donor had no copyright to donate. If, after receiving 
notice, the borrower continued to publish infringing content (e.g., 
failed to take down her videos incorporating infringing library videos), 
then the copyright holder could sue the borrower for such post-
notice infringement.74 
 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id.; Cavanaugh, supra note 64, at 458 (“Once the recipient constructively learns 
of the breach and the trade secret status of the information, continued use is infringement.”). 
 74. No doubt, this would be frustrating for good faith borrowers, especially if they put 
significant time and energy into creating videos that happen to contain offending content. 
Depending on how minor the infringing elements are in the context of the complete work, 
continued publication may be excused under the doctrine of fair use. Also, the good faith 
borrower may have a right to a remedy against the wrongful library donor under a breach of 
contract theory. A court could possibly find that giving attribution in exchange for the license 
to use a video could comprise consideration sufficient to make a legally binding agreement. 
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It is important to remember that the standard penalizing the 
second publication of trade secrets hinges on whether the second 
publisher knew or should have known he was publishing a trade secret. 
Thus, ignorance is not an absolute defense for trade secret 
misappropriation. Nor should ignorance be an absolute defense for 
Creative Commons borrower infringement of copyright. There may 
be times when Creative Commons borrowers should be liable because 
they “should have known” that donors did not have the right to 
donate the videos they uploaded to the library. For example, a donor 
may upload a video that is clearly a recording of a news broadcast, 
television show, or a movie. Such uploads to the Creative Commons 
library should be highly suspect in the eyes of a reasonable borrower. 
Similarly, Creative Commons borrowers should be on their guard for 
apparently high-jacked paintings, “periscoped” concerts, or 
bootlegged music. 
C. Why Extending Trade Secret Second-Publisher Protections to 
Copyright Infringement Makes Sense 
There is no legitimate justification for protecting good-faith 
second publishers under trade secret law, but not under copyright law. 
Likes should be treated alike under the law. Trade secret and copyright 
laws attempt to serve identical purposes. Both help respond to the 
Constitutional mandate “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”75 In 
other words, both aim to incentivize innovation.76 Also, both try to 
 
 75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003) (tying federal 
copyright protections to the clause); Judge Richard Posner, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A 
Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 473 n.75 
(1993) (discussing trade secret laws in the context of the clause). 
 76. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) (“The 
purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.”); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo 
of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The Copyright Act encourages authors to 
share their creative works with society.”); 3M v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 595 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(“[T]he purpose of trade secret law is to encourage innovation and development.”); 
Briefing.com v. Jones, 126 P.3d 928, 930 (Wyo. 2006) (“Trade secret laws have their genesis in 
society’s need to encourage innovation and to foster standards of trust in the marketplace.”). 
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strike a healthy balance between innovation incentives and First 
Amendment free speech rights.77 
 The “secret” aspect of trade secrets is not a valid reason for treating 
trade secrets differently from copyrighted works. Copyright protections 
do not just extend to published works, but also unpublished works.78 
Thus, the “secret” aspect of trade secrets should not provide any 
meaningful distinction from copyright. It could be argued that 
disclosure of a trade secret is much more egregious than infringing a 
copyright because of the havoc it could wreak on a company. 
However, if anything, that argument supports granting trade secrets 
greater recourse against secondary-publishers, not less than those 
available in the copyright context. There is no good argument for 
punishing secondary infringers of copyright more than secondary 
infringers of trade secrets, as is currently the case. 
 Protecting good faith borrowers fuels innovation. Extending second-
publisher protections to good faith Creative Commons borrowers will 
encourage creators to utilize the YouTube library to create innovative 
works. Without such protections, would-be borrowers may hesitate to 
use the library at all—even though many of the works available are 
non-infringing—for fear of grabbing a bad apple and getting sued. It 
would take a great deal of effort to determine the legitimacy of each 
individual video before borrowing. The vast majority of copyrights go 
unregistered. It may be impossible to communicate with a donor 
about his or her actual rights to the video. Even if a borrower had 
some form of conversation with a donor, that donor may mislead the 
borrower. It may difficult to know whether to take a donor at his 
word. Imposing on borrowers the difficult burden of vetting Creative 
Commons content would almost certainly stifle creativity. Though 
borrowers might still occasionally be required to take down or modify 
a video to remove offending portions upon notice of infringement, 
 
 77. Whelan Assoc’s v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“[T]he purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive balance 
between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to promote learning, culture 
and development.”); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Symposium, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is 
it Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1428 (2009) (“The challenge is to 
apply these standards with sufficient rigor to achieve the optimal balance between plaintiff trade 
secret holder’s rights and defendants’ free speech rights . . . .”). 
 78. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 581 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(“[U]npublished works normally enjoy complete protection against copying any 
protected expression.”). 
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that possibility is much less paralyzing than the possibility of being 
sued for damages. 
 Protecting good faith borrowers does not unduly expose copyright 
holders. In addition to promoting innovation among the YouTube 
community, it cannot be reasonably said that extending second-
publisher protections to good-faith Creative Commons borrowers will 
dissuade injured copyright holders from creating future works. Those 
injured by infringing donations to the library would still have 
remedies. As mentioned above, the copyright holder can always sue 
donors, who almost always know or should know when they 
uploading works to the library that they do not own. Additionally, 
those injured can still notify second publishers and enjoin future use. 
 Protecting good faith borrowers avoids damage to commercial 
morality and respect for legal authority. By its callous nature, strict 
liability, whether in trade secret or copyright contexts, diminishes 
commercial morality79 while simultaneously fostering disdain for 
legal authority.80  
Protecting good faith borrowers does not harm judicial economy. It is 
true that eliminating questions of culpability can “reduce the costs 
associated with resolving individual disputes.”81 But, it is also true that 
“strict liability may increase overall costs by markedly increasing the 
total volume of copyright infringement claims.”82 Taken together, 
there is no strong efficiency argument necessitating strict liability.  
Protecting good faith borrowers is in the interest of economic 
efficiency. There are economic efficiency considerations in copyright 
that are similar to those found in trade secret law.83 Rather than 
 
   79. Jay Dratler Jr. & Stephen M. McJohn, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 4.04(5)(a) (“Strict liability would not 
promote the policy of fostering commercial morality, for by definition innocent acquirers of trade 
secrets have done nothing immoral.”). So too have innocent second publishers of copyrighted 
works done nothing immoral. 
 80. Id. (“Imposing liability without fault would only encourage resentment and disrespect 
for law.”). 
 81. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 15, at 388. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (“[S]trict liability would undermine the policies of economic efficiency that 
underlie trade secret protection. If the law imposed strict liability for use of others’ [sic] trade 
secrets without fault, every firm that hired a new employee or contractor would have to check 
the employment history and honesty of the individual involved, and every firm that received a 
license of unpatented technology would have to check its pedigree, in order to reduce the risk 
of strict liability. The result would be an increase in the cost and a decrease in the incidence of 
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maintaining the current redundancy where both the video donor and 
borrower bear the burden of expending resources to avoid 
infringement, it makes more sense to put the risk on the more 
knowledgeable party: the donor, whose avoidance costs are likely 
de minimis.84 
 Protecting good faith borrowers is not a departure from precedent 
but a restoration of historic principles. Finally, state-of-mind-
contingent, second-publisher copyright liability is more true to the 
original American copyright regime than strict liability. Some 
incorrectly believe that “strict liability is justified in copyright today 
because it was a part of copyright yesterday.”85 Strict liability became 
a part of the American copyright picture in 1909.86 Before that, 
liability was tempered in many ways that resemble the approach this 
Comment suggests. 
Early American colonial and state copyright law leaned heavily87 
on England’s 1710 Statute of Anne, which protected innocent 
infringers in a host of ways. For example, “the statute contained 
stringent registration and notice requirements” and “distinguished 
among classes of infringers based, in part, on their relative culpability 
or innocence.”88 
Some of those protections endured through the birth of federal 
copyright legislation in 1790.89 Notably, when distributing infringing 
copies of works, distributors incurred liability only if they knew their 
copies of works were illegitimate.90 This protection continued with the 
Copyright of Act of 1870 and did not disappear until 1909.91 In other 
words, America recognized such protections on a state or federal level 
 
both employee mobility and licensing[—]the very sorts of economic inefficiencies that trade 
secret protection seeks to avoid.”). 
 84. If any redundancy ought to exist at all, it would make more sense to share liability 
between YouTube and the wrongful donor. Borrowers certainly rely on the representations of 
donors, but they also rely on YouTube’s representations that library videos are fair game. 
 85. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 15, at 359. 
 86. Id. at 361. 
 87. Id. at 360. It more or less became the law in many states. Id. (“Many states followed 
the British model verbatim and carefully constructed their statutes to distinguish between 
innocent and willful infringers.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 359–60. 
 89. Id. at 361. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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for 133 years. Thus, the state of the law for the 106 years since can be 
no more considered the historical rule than the exception. 
The particular exception protecting good faith distributors is not 
very different from the second-publisher protections this Comment 
encourages. Distributors rely on those they purchase from, without an 
easy way to confirm the veracity of supplier representations. Similarly, 
Creative Commons borrowers rely on the representations of library 
donors in re-distributing video content, without an easy way to know 
the legitimacy of the video’s license. 
In summary, extending trade secret second-publisher protections 
to copyrighted material would not only buoy innovation, discourage 
commercial immorality, and boost judicial and economic efficiency, 
but would also be in harmony with the historic American 
copyright system. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Many innocent video creators who leverage YouTube’s Creative 
Commons library could be independently liable for the copyright 
wrongs committed by library donors. Instead of penalizing innocent 
borrowers and subjecting them to undue burdens of investigation, 
copyright law should adopt an approach akin to the treatment of 
second publishers under trade secret law. Borrowers should not face 
liability for using a video held out as fair game in YouTube’s Creative 
Commons library unless they know or have reason to know that the 
library donor did not have authority to grant a license for that video. 
The adoption of this rule, which could and should apply beyond 
YouTube’s Creative Commons library to other second-publisher 
contexts, would serve the Constitutional purpose of copyright 
protection by increasing innovation. Adopting this rule would also 
help return United States copyright law to its original, state-of-mind-
contingent regime. 
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